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ABSTRACT
Getting agents in the Internet, and in networks in general,
to invest in and deploy security features and protocols is
a challenge, in particular because of economic reasons aris-
ing from the presence of network externalities. Our goal in
this paper is to model and investigate the impact of such
externalities on security investments in a network.
Specifically, we study a network of interconnected agents
subject to epidemic risks such as viruses and worms where
agents can decide whether or not to invest some amount
to deploy security solutions. We consider both cases when
the security solutions are strong (they perfectly protect the
agents deploying them) and when they are weak. We make
three contributions in the paper. First, we introduce a gen-
eral model which combines an epidemic propagation model
with an economic model for agents which captures network
effects and externalities. Second, borrowing ideas and tech-
niques used in statistical physics, we introduce a Local Mean
Field (LMF) model, which extends the standard mean-field
approximation to take into account the correlation structure
on local neighborhoods. Third, we solve the LMF model in a
network with externalities, and we derive analytic solutions
for sparse random graphs of agents, for which we obtain
asymptotic results. We find known phenomena such as free
riders and tipping points. We also observe counter-intuitive
phenomena, such as increasing the quality of the security
technology can result in a decreased adoption of that tech-
nology in the network. In general, we find that both situa-
tions with strong and weak protection exhibit externalities
and that the equilibrium is not socially optimal - therefore
there is a market failure. Insurance is one mechanism to
address this market failure. In related work, we have shown
that insurance is a very effective mechanism [3, 4] and ar-
gue that using insurance would increase the security in a
network such as the Internet.
Keywords
Security, Game Theory, Epidemics, Economics, Price of An-
to appear in NetEcon’08 [11]. This version includes proofs (given in Ap-
pendix) of results stated in [11].
archy, Tipping, Free rider problem.
1. INTRODUCTION
Users and computers in the Internet face a wide range
of security risks. Of particular concern, are epidemic risks,
such as those propagated by worms and viruses. Epidemic
risks depend on the behavior of other entities in the network,
such as whether or not those entities invest in security solu-
tions to minimize their likelihood of being infected. Our goal
in this paper is to analyze the strategic behavior of agents
facing such epidemic risks.
The propagation of worms and viruses [16, 7], but also
many other phenomena in the Internet such as the propa-
gation of alerts and patches [14] or of routing updates [5],
can be modeled using epidemic spreads through a network.
As a result, there is now a vast body of literature on epi-
demic spreads over a network topology from an initial set
of infected nodes to susceptible nodes. However, much of
that work has focused on modeling and understanding the
propagation of the epidemics proper, without considering
the impact of network effects and externalities.
Recent work which did model such effects has been lim-
ited to the simple case of two agents, i.e. a two-node net-
work. For example, reference [9] proposes a parametric
game-theoretic model for such a situation. In the model,
agents decide whether or not to invest in security and agents
face a risk of infection which depends on the state of other
agents. The authors show the existence of two Nash equilib-
ria (all agents invest or none invests), and suggest that tax-
ation or insurance would be ways to provide incentives for
agents to invest (and therefore reach the ”good” Nash equi-
librium). However, their approach does not scale to the case
of N agents, and it does not handle various network topolo-
gies connecting those agents. Our work addresses precisely
those limitations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we describe our model for epidemic risks with network effects
and externalities. In Section 3, we introduce our Local Mean
Field Model (LMF) and state asymptotic results that can be
obtained with LMF. In Section 4, we use the LMF model
to examine both cases when agents invest in strong security
solutions (which perfectly protect the agents deploying them
against propagated risks) and in weak solutions. We find
known phenomena such as free riders and tipping points
[4]. We also observe counter-intuitive phenomena, such as
increasing the quality of the security technology can result
in a decreased adoption of that technology in the network.
In Section 5, we discuss our results and conclude the paper.
2. A MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC RISKS AND
NETWORK EFFECTS
2.1 Economic model for the agents
Wemodel agents using the classical expected utility model,
where agents attempt to maximize a utility function u. We
assume that agents are rational and that they are risk averse,
i.e. their utility function is concave (see Proposition 2.1 in
[8]). Risk averse agents dislike mean-preserving spreads in
the distribution of their final wealth.
We denote by w the initial wealth of the agent. The risk
premium π is the maximum amount of money that one is
ready to pay to escape a pure risk X, where a pure risk X
is a random variable such that E[X] = 0. The risk premium
corresponds to an amount of money paid (thus decreasing
the wealth of the agent from w to w − π) which covers the
risk; hence, π is given by the following equation: u[w−π] =
E[u[w +X]].
Each agent faces a potential loss ℓ, which we take in this
paper to be a fixed (non-random) value. We denote by p the
probability of loss or damage. There are two possible final
states for the agent: a good state, in which the final wealth
of the agent is equal to his initial wealth w, and a bad state
in which the final wealth is w − ℓ. If the probability of loss
is p > 0, the risk is clearly not a pure risk. The amount of
money m the agent is ready to invest to escape the risk is
given by the equation: pu[w − ℓ] + (1− p)u[w] = u[w −m].
We clearly have m > pℓ thanks to the concavity of u. We
can actually relate m to the risk premium defined above:
m = pℓ+ π[p].
An agent can invest some amount in self-protection, which
in practice would reflect an investment in antivirus or anomaly
detection solutions. If an agent decides to invest in self-
protection, we say that the agent is in state S (as in Safe or
Secure). If the agent decides not to invest in self-protection,
it is in state N (Not safe). If the agent does not invest, its
probability of loss is pN . If it does invest, for an amount
which we assume is a fixed amount c, then its loss probabil-
ity is reduced and equal to pS < pN .
In state N , the expected utility of the agent is pNu[w−ℓ]+
(1− pN)u[w]; in state S, the expected utility is pSu[w− ℓ−
c]+(1−pS)u[w−c]. Using the definition of risk premium, we
see that these quantities are equal to u[w−pNℓ−π[pN ]] and
u[w − c− pSℓ− π[pS]], respectively. Therefore, the optimal
strategy is for the agent to invest in self-protection only if
the cost for self-protection is less than the threshold
c < (pN − pS)ℓ+ π[pN ]− π[pS]. (1)
2.2 Epidemic model
We describe now our model for the epidemic risk. Agents
are represented by vertices of a graph. We assume that an
agent in state S has a probability p− of direct loss and an
agent in state N has a probability p+ of direct loss with
p+ ≥ p−. Then any infected agent contaminates neigh-
bors independently of each others with probability q− if the
neighbor is in state S and q+ if the neighbor is in state N ,
with q+ ≥ q−.
Special cases of this model are examined in [10], where
q+ = q−, and in [12], where agents in state S are completely
secure and cannot be infected, i.e. p− = q− = 0.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph on a countable vertex set V .
Agents are represented by vertices of the graph. For i, j ∈ V ,
we write i ∼ j if (i, j) ∈ E and we say that agents i and j are
neighbors. The state of agent i is represented by Xi; agent
i is infected (respectively healthy) iff Xi = 1 (respectively
Xi = 0).
We now describe the fundamental recursion satisfied by
the vector X. We first introduce the following sequences of
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
(r.v.):
• (AS, ASi , i ∈ N) Bernoulli r.v. with parameter p
−;
• (AN , ANi , i ∈ N) Bernoulli r.v. with parameter p
+;
• (BSi , B
S
ji, i, j ∈ N) Bernoulli r.v. with parameter q
−;
• (BNi , B
N
ji , i, j ∈ N) Bernoulli r.v. with parameter q
+.
Let Di = 1 if agent i is in state S and Di = 0 otherwise.
We define φi = DiA
S
i +(1−Di)A
N
i . The variable φi models
the direct loss: if φi = 1 there is a direct loss for agent i,
otherwise there is no direct loss for agent i. We also define
θji = DiB
S
ji + (1 − Di)B
N
ji . The variable θji models the
possible contagion from agent j to agent i: if θji = 1, there
is contagion otherwise there is no contagion.
Then the fundamental recursion satisfied by the vector
X = (Xi, i ∈ V ) is
1−Xi = (1− φi)
Y
j∼i
(1− θjiXj). (2)
2.3 Epidemic risks for interconnected agents
In order to completely specify our model, we still need to
define how to choose the variables Di, i.e. whether agent i
invests in self-protection (corresponding to Di = 1) or not
(Di = 0).
First, note that the probability of loss for agent i is given,
depending on whether or not it invests in self protection, by
pSi := E[Xi|Di = 1], or, (3)
pNi := E[Xi|Di = 0]. (4)
In view of (1), the best response of agent i is given by:
Di = 1(ci < (p
N
i − p
S
i )ℓi + πi[p
N
i ]− πi[p
S
i ]), (5)
where pSi and p
N
i are given by (3) and (4).
Our model is defined by the graph G (which topology is
arbitrary) and the set of Equations (2,3,4,5). In the rest of
this paper, we will make a simplifying assumption: we con-
sider a heterogeneous population, where agents differ only
in self-protection cost and potential loss. The cost of protec-
tion should not exceed the possible loss, hence 0 ≤ ci ≤ ℓi.
The cost ci and the potential loss ℓi are known to agent i
and varies among the population. Hence we model this het-
erogeneous population by taking the sequence (ci, ℓii ∈ N)
as a sequence of i.i.d. random variables independent of ev-
erything else.
So far, we have not yet specified the underlying graph.
We will consider random families of graphs G(n) with n ver-
tices and give asymptotic results as n tends to infinity. In
all cases, we assume that the family of graphs G(n) is inde-
pendent of all other processes.
3. LOCAL MEAN FIELD MODEL
In this section, we introduce our Local Mean Field (LMF)
model. It extends the standard mean-field approximation by
allowing to model the correlation structure on local neigh-
borhoods. It can be shown that the LMF gives the exact
asymptotic behavior of the process X as the number of ver-
tices tends to infinity for sparse random graphs with asymp-
totic given degree distribution P (d) (see [6] for a definition).
A rigorous proof of this fact can be found in [10] for a par-
ticular case of the model described in Section 2.2. We will
not attemp to give a general proof here. The main tool is
the notion of local weak convergence [2].
3.1 Exact results for trees
Since the graphs we are considering can be considered lo-
cally to be like trees (with high probability), we first examine
the case where G = T is a tree with nodes , 1, . . . and a fixed
root .
For a node i, we denote by gen(i) ∈ N the generation of i,
i.e. the length of the minimal path from to i. Also we denote
i→ j if i is a children of j, i.e. gen(i) = gen(j) + 1 and j is
on the minimal path from to i. For an edge (i, j) ∈ E with
i→ j, we denote by Ti→j the sub-tree of T with root i when
deleting edge (i, j) from T . We have a family of trees Ti→j
and we run the epidemic model according to equation (2)
with the same variables (BSi , B
N
i , B
S
ij , B
N
ij , ci, ℓi, i, j ∈ N) on
each tree. Hence the epidemics on the various subtree of T
are coupled thanks to these random variables. We say that
node i is infected from Ti→j if the node i is infected in Ti→j .
We denote by Yi the corresponding indicator function with
value 1 if i is infected from Ti→j and 0 otherwise. A simple
induction shows that the recursion (2) becomes:
1− Yi = (1− φi)
Y
k→i
(1− θkiYk) . (6)
If the tree T is finite, we can compute all the Yi recursively
starting from the leaves with Yℓ = φℓ for any leaf ℓ. As a
consequence (and this is the main difference with (2) which
makes the model on a tree tractable), the random variables
Yk with k → i in the right-hand term of (6) are independent
of each others and independent of the θki. For any node
i ∈ T , we just defined Yi and the family (Yi, i ∈ T ) is a
tree-indexed process called a Recursive Tree Process (RTP).
Consider now the case where T is a Galton-Watson branch-
ing process with offspring distribution P ∗. The tree T is now
possibly infinite but it is still possible to define an invariant
RTP on T . One way to construct it consists in defining a
RTP for each finite depth-d tree and then show that these
RTPs converge to an invariant RTP as the depth d tends to
infinity [1]. We first introduce the Recursive Distributional
Equation (RDE):
Y
d
= 1− (1− φ)
N∗Y
k=1
(1− θkYk), (7)
where N∗ has distribution P ∗, φ = DAS + (1 − D)AN ,
θk = DB
S
k + (1 − D)B
N
k where D is a Bernoulli r.v. with
parameter γ, Y and Yk are i.i.d. copies. We also assume
that the random variables D, AS, AN , BSk , B
N
k and Yk are
independent of each others. Note however that φ and the
θ’s are not independent of each others. RDE for RTP plays
a similar role as the equation µ = µK for the stationary
distribution of a Markov chain with kernel K, see [1]. The
following result (proved in Appendix 7.1) solves the RDE.
Proposition 1. For p+ > 0, the RDE (13) has a unique
solution: Y is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter
h(γ), the unique solution in [0, 1] of
h = 1− γ(1− p−)GN(1− q
−h)− (1− γ)(1− p+)GN (1− q
+h)
where GN∗ (x) = E[x
N∗ ] is the generating function of the
distribution P ∗. Moreover the function γ 7→ h(γ) is non-
increasing in γ.
As a consequence, we see that it is possible to construct an
invariant version of the RTP on the tree T where for each
k ≥ 0, the sequence (Yi, i ∈ T, gen(i) = k) is a sequence of
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter h, see [1].
3.2 LMF associated to a random network
Our LMF model is characterized by the connectivity dis-
tribution P (d) but the underlying tree T as to be slightly
modified compare to previous section: if we start with a
given vertex then the number of neighbors (the first gener-
ation in the branching process) has distribution P but this
is not true for the second generation. Let T be a Galton-
Watson branching process with a root which has offspring
distribution P and all other nodes have offspring distribu-
tion P ∗ given by P ∗(d− 1) = dP (d)P
dP (d)
for all d ≥ 1.
Remark 1. Note that if P is the Poisson distribution
with parameter λ which is the asymptotic degree distribution
for Erdos-Renyi graph G(n, λ/n), then P ∗ is also Poisson
with mean λ.
We now explain how to define the LMF based on the analysis
made in previous section. Clearly, the crucial point in recur-
sion (6) is the fact that the Yi can be computed“bottom-up”.
However a node can also be infected from its parent and Yi
is NOT a good approximation of the real process Xi. Indeed
the only node for which previous analysis gives an approxi-
mation of the process X is for the root and the Yi’s encode
the information that the root is infected by an agent in the
subtree of T “below” i.
Hence we define
X(D)
d
= 1− (1− φ)
NY
k=1
(1− θkYk) , (8)
where N has distribution P , φ and θk are the same as in (13)
and the Yk’s are i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v. with parameter h(γ),
i.e. satisfying the RDE (13) with N∗ having distribution
P ∗.
3.3 Asymptotic results
We now show how to get quantitative results from our
LMF. The goal of Section 4 is to derive such results for
various cases.
We consider a family of random graphs on n vertices G(n)
and the associated process (X
(n)
i , i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}) satisfy-
ing the equations of our model on G(n). We assume that our
family of random graphs converges locally to a tree as de-
scribed in previsous section. This property is true for sparse
random graphs [2]. It can be shown that the process X(n) is
asymptotically equivalent to the process defined on the tree,
i.e. the corresponding LMF model described in previous sec-
tion [10]. Hence we restict our analysis to the LMF model
and the quantities computed here correspond to the asymp-
totic values of the corresponding quantites for the process
X(n) for large values of n.
Let γ be the fraction of the population investing in self-
protection. Then by symetry, the random variables Di are
i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v. with parameter γ. Thanks to the results
of the previous section, we can compute the law of the Xi’s.
From this law, we can compute the corresponding probabil-
ity of loss depending on the choice made to invest or not.
Then one has to check self-consistency: the fraction of the
population for which the best-response consists in invest-
ing in self-protection should be γ. Hence to solve our LMF
model, we need to solve the following fixed point equation:
pN,γ = E[X(D)|D = 0]
= 1− E
"
(1− AN)
NY
i=1
(1−BNi Yi)
#
, (9)
pS,γ = E[X(D)|D = 1]
= 1− E
"
(1− AS)
NY
i=1
(1−BSi Yi)
#
, (10)
cγ = (pN,γ − pS,γ)ℓ+ π[pN,γ ]− π[pS,γ ], (11)
γ = P(c ≤ cγ), (12)
where the distribution of X(D) is given by (8) or equiva-
lently the Yi are i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v. with parameter h(γ)
given by Proposition 1.
Let γ∗ be a solution of this fixed point equation. Then we
have the following interpretations: γ∗ is the fraction of the
population investing in self-protection, pN,γ
∗
is the prob-
ability of loss for an agent not investing in self-protection
and pS,γ
∗
is the probability of loss for an agent investing in
self-protection. Hence the average probability of loss is
E[X(D)] = γ∗pS,γ
∗
+ (1− γ∗)pN,γ
∗
.
The outcome of rational behavior by self-interested agents
can be inferior to a centrally designed outcome. By how
much? The price of anarchy, the most popular measure of
the inefficiency of equilibria, is defined as the ratio between
the worst objective function value of an equilibrium of the
game and that of an optimal outcome (possibly centralized
in which case it will not be described by the model intro-
duced above). In our setting, the cost incurred to agent i is
ci + p
S
i ℓi+ πi(p
S
i ) if it invests in security and p
N
i ℓi+ πi(p
N
i )
otherwise. So for a given equilibrium, we can compute the
total cost incurred to the population. The price of anarchy
is the ratio of the largest (among all equilibria) such cost
divided by the optimal cost. The price of anarchy is at least
1 and a value close to 1 indicates that the given outcome is
approximately optimal. We refer to [13] for an introduction
to the inefficiency of equilibria (in particular chapter 17).
We show in the next section how to compute this price of
anarchy.
4. NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY FEATURES
We next use our LMF model to compare the following
situations:
• Case 1: Strong protection. If an agent invest in self-
protection, it cannot be harmed at all by the actions
or inactions of others: p− = q− = 0 (this is as in [12])
• Case 2: Weak protection. Investing in self-protection
does not change the probability of contagion: q+ = q−
(as in [10])
In both cases, agents that invest in self-protection incur some
cost and in return receive some individual benefit through
the reduced individual expected loss. But part of the benefit
is public, namely the reduced indirect risk in the economy
from which everybody benefits. Hence, there is a negative
externality associated with not investing in self-protection,
namely the increased risk to others.
4.1 Erdos-Renyi graphs
We analyze our model on a large sparse random graph
G(n) = G(n, λ/n) on n nodes {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, where each
potential edge (i, j), 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n−1 is present in the graph
with probability λ/n, independently for all n(n−1)/2 edges.
Here λ > 0 is a fixed constant independent of n. This cor-
responds to the case of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph which has
received considerable attention in the past [6]. As explained
in Section 3, our analysis is not restricted to this class of
graphs, but it is simpler in this case since the degree distri-
bution P is a Poisson distribution with mean λ (see Remark
1).
In this case, the fixed point equation for h(γ) in Proposi-
tion 1 becomes:
h = 1− γ(1− p−)e−λq
−h − (1− γ)(1− p+)e−λq
+h.
Then the equations (9) and (10) are given by:
pN,γ = 1− (1− p+)e−λq
+h(γ),
pS,γ = 1− (1− p−)e−λq
−h(γ).
For simplicity, we drop the risk adverse condition, so that
π ≡ 0 and we assume that costs for the self-protection are
the same for all agents and equal to c, and the possible losses
are also the same and equal to ℓ. Then we have
cγ =
“
(1− p−)e−λq
−h(γ) − (1− p+)e−λq
+h(γ)
”
ℓ.
Recall that an agent decides to invest in self-protection iff
c < cγ . The monotonicity of cγ in γ is crucial and it depends
on the value of the parameters (p+, p−, q+, q−).
4.2 Case 1: Strong protection
We first consider Case 1 where p− = q− = 0, so that
pS,γ = 0 and cγ = pN,γℓ =
“
1− (1− p+)e−λq
+h(γ)
”
ℓ. Then
by Proposition 1, γ 7→ cγ is non-increasing and the fixed
point equation (9,10,11,12) has a unique solution. In this
case, as γ the fraction of agents investing in self-protection
increases, the incentive to invest in self-protection decreases.
In fact, it is less attractive for an agent to invest in self-
protection, should others then decide to do so. As more
agents invest, the expected benefit of following suit decreases
since there is a reduction in the negative externalities which
translates into a lower probability of loss. Hence there is a
unique equilibrium point which is a Nash equilibrium. How-
ever, there is a wide range of parameters for which the Nash
equilibrium will not be socially optimal because agents do
not take into account the negative externalities they are cre-
ating in determining whether to invest or not. Indeed it is
easily shown that at least for c > p+ℓ, the price of anarchy
is strictly larger than one (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Price of anarchy for c/ℓ in the vicinity of
p+ = 0.01.
Proposition 2. The fixed point equation (9,10,11,12) re-
duces to
h =
hℓ
c
“
1− (1− p+)e−λq
+h
”
and, 1− γ =
hℓ
c
.
It has a unique solution. The price of anarchy is given by
Pa(c) = sup
γ
c
γc+ h(γ)ℓ
,
where h(γ) is the unique solution of
h = (1− γ)
“
1− (1− p+)e−λq
+h
”
See Appendix 7.2 for a proof.
4.3 Case 2: Weak protection
We now consider Case 2 where q+ = q−, so that γ 7→ cγ
is non-decreasing. The analysis of this case is described [10]
(see Proposition 5). The situation is quite different from
the results we derived for Case 1 above. In particular, we
can have two Nash equilibria involving everyone or no one
investing in security. When there are two Nash equilibria,
the socially optimal solution is always for everyone to in-
vest: each agent will find that the cost of investing in self-
protection will be justified if it does not incur any negative
externalities and society will be better off as well.
Proposition 3. We have c0 < c1 and
• if c < c0, then there is only one Nash equilibrium where
every agent invest in self-protection;
• if c > c1, then there is only one Nash equilibrium where
no agent invest in self-protection;
• if c0 < c < c1, then both Nash equilibria are possible.
The price of anarchy is given by:
Pa(c) = 1 ∨ 1(c
0 < c)
h(0)ℓ
c+ h(1)ℓ
.
If we take p− = 0, then we have h(1) = 0 and h(0) = h∗
solution of h∗ = 1− (1− p+)e−λqh
∗
. So that we have
Pa(c) ∼
h∗ℓ
c
.
Figure 2 shows the value of h∗ as a function of λq+. Note
that typically c = o(ℓ) so that the price of anarchy can be
substantially larger than one.
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Figure 2: Price of anarchy: h∗ as a function of λq+,
with p+ = 0.01 and p− = 0.
5. DISCUSSION
We have shown that both situations with strong or weak
protections exhibit externalities and that the equilibrium is
not socially optimal: therefore, there is a market failure.
However there are several important differences to under-
stand between strong and weak protections before trying to
resolve this market failure.
In case 1, the situation is similar to the free-rider problem
which arises in the production of public goods. If all then
agents invest in self-protection, then the general security
level of the network is very high since the probability of loss
is zero. But a self-interested agent would not continue to
pay for self-protection since it incurs a cost c for preventing
only direct losses that have very low probabilities. When
the general security level of the network is high, there is no
incentive for investing in self-protection. This results in an
under-protected network.
Note that in this case, if the cost for self-protection is not
prohibitive, there is always a non-negligible fraction of the
agents investing in self-protection. In case 2, the situation is
quite different since no agent at all invests in self-protection.
Even if a small fraction of agents does invest, and so raises
the general level of security of the network, it is not sufficient
for the benefit obtained by investing in self-protection for a
new agent to be larger than the cost of self-protection.
These facts seem very relevant to the situation observed
in the Internet, where under-investment in security solutions
and security controls has long been considered an issue. Se-
curity managers typically face challenges in providing jus-
tification for security investments, and in 2003, the Presi-
dent’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace stated that
government action is required where ”market failures result
in under-investment in cybersecurity” [15].
It shows the power of our basic model to note that these
interesting and very relevant phenomena emerge from our
analysis. Note also that these phenomena correspond to
two extreme values of the parameter q−, namely case 1 cor-
responds to q− = 0 and case 2 corresponds to q− = q+.
Hence taking p− = 0 and fixing all other parameters, we
have a family of models indexed by q−, denoted simply q in
what follows, which varies ’continuously’ between the two
cases.
Recall that q is the probability of contagion when the
agent invests in self-protection. If q = 0, the agent is com-
pletely secure whereas for q = q−, agents have the same
probability of contagion whatever their choices to invest or
not in self-protection. Hence q can be interpreted as the in-
verse of the quality of the technology used for self-protection.
First note that when q = 0, the technology is ’perfect’
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Figure 3: Adoption curves
since there is no possible loss. We are in the situation of
case 1 and we see that due to purely economic reasons, the
technology is under-deployed in the network because people
’free-ride’ the benefit of the technology. Consider now the
case of an arbitrary q. Figure 3 shows the adoption curves
for different values of q. This curve shows the fraction of
the population investing in security technology as a func-
tion of its cost (normalized by the loss). Other parameters
are p+ = 0.01, q+ = 0.5 and λ = 10.
We observe some counter-intuitive phenomena. First for a
fixed price, increasing the quality of the security technology
can lead to a decrease of its adoption in the population! Here
is a qualitative interpretation of how this arises: when the
technology is not very good, propagation of the epidemic is
possible even if the agent uses the technology. Then agents
have to pool their efforts in order to compensate for the
weakness of the technology. In other words, a large number
must invest in self-protection in order to have an acceptable
level of security. But when the technology becomes better,
then agents that did invest in it start to step down from the
group of investors and choose to free-ride.
Second there is a barrier for choosing self-protection (ex-
cept when q = 0). Namely for a fixed q, we see that there is
a range for the parameter c (close to c0) such that the popu-
lation is ’trapped’ in state N whereas for the same values of
the parameters, the situation where a large fraction of the
population is investing would be a sustainable equilibrium
point. There is a possibility of tipping or cascading: induc-
ing some agents to invest in self-protection will lead others
to follow suit. The curves of Figure 3 allow us to quantify
the minimal number of agents to induce in order to trigger
a large cascade of adoption.
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7. APPENDIX
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that the RDE is given by:
Y
d
= 1− (1− φ)
N∗Y
k=1
(1− θkYk),
where N∗ has distribution P ∗, φ = DAS + (1 − D)AN ,
θk = DB
S
k + (1 − D)B
N
k where D is a Bernoulli r.v. with
parameter γ, Y and Yk are i.i.d. copies. Let h = P(Y = 1),
then we have
h = P
 
D = 1, (1−AS)
N∗Y
k=1
(1−BSk Yk) = 0
!
+P
 
D = 0, (1− AN)
N∗Y
k=1
(1−BNk Yk) = 0
!
= γ(1− P(AS = 0))E
h
P(BSk Yk = 0)
N∗
i
+(1− γ)(1− P(AN = 0))E
h
P(BNk Yk = 0)
N∗
i
,
and the first part of Proposition 1 follows.
We define:
f(x, γ) = 1− γ(1− p−)GN∗ (1− q
−x)
−(1− γ)(1− p+)GN∗(1− q
+x),
so that h is solution of the fixed point equation h = f(h, γ).
By taking the derivate of f in x, we see that x 7→ f(x, γ)
is a non-decreasing concave function. Note that f(0, γ) =
γp− + (1 − γ)p+ ≥ (1 − γ)p+ and f(1, γ) ≤ 1. So that
for γ < 1, there exists a unique solution to the fixed point
equation h = f(h, γ). If γ = 1, we have f(0, 1) = p− and
f(1, 1) < 1. Then if p− = 0, the fixed point equation has a
unique solution h = 0 and if p− > 0, then f(0, 1) > 0 and
the fixed point equation has still an unique solution.
We now prove that the function γ 7→ h(γ) is non-increasing.
By taking the derivate of the function γ 7→ f(x, γ), we see
that this function is non-increasing in γ (while x is fixed).
Then for u ≤ v, we get
f(h(u), u) = h(u) ≥ f(h(u), v) ≥ f(f(h(u), v), v) ≥ h(v),
and the claimed monotonicity of h follows.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the fixed point equation for h(γ) is:
h = (1− γ)
“
1− (1− p+)e−λq
+h
”
.
Consider now that the cost c and loss ℓ are random variables
such that the function t 7→ P(c/ℓ ≤ t) is continuous, then
Equation (12) is
γ = P
“
c ≤ ℓ
“
1− (1− p+)e−λq
+h(γ)
””
= P
„
c
ℓ
≤
h(γ)
1− γ
«
.
Since the function h is non-increasing, we see that the right-
hand side of the first line is a non-increasing function in γ,
hence there exists a unique solution γ∗ to this fixed point
equation. If we take a sequence of distributions such c/ℓ
tends to a constant, we see that the solution γ∗ is such that
c
ℓ
=
h(γ∗)
1− γ∗
,
and the first part of Proposition 2 follows.
Note that we have pN,γ = h(γ)/(1 − γ). So for a fixed
γ, the average cost incured to the population is γc + (1 −
γ)pN,γℓ = γc + h(γ)ℓ. Now for γ = γ∗, we have h(γ∗)ℓ =
(1− γ∗)c, so that the average cost is just c and the last part
of Proposition 2 follows.
